Golden goblets of fine wine, stained with the blood of thousands,
Jade plates of delicacies, soaked in the toil of the masses.
As the candles weep, so do the people,
Where songs rise high, so do the cries of lament.
——— One of the ballads recited by the Donghak Peasants
As early as the beginning of 1894, Count Cassini, the Russian Minister to China, reported to St. Petersburg: "Judging by various signs, the dissatisfaction of the Korean people and their hostile attitude towards the government are spreading nationwide... The entire country of Korea has been in a state of heavy and increasingly growing indignation for quite some time now, and this indignation is highly susceptible to erupting into open rebellion."
The Donghak movement in Korea has a long history; if we were to draw a comparison, it is akin to Korea's version of the "God Worshipping Society."
The Joseon Dynasty of Korea was no different from the Qing Dynasty in China, and perhaps even more decayed. The people endured the dual oppression of imperialism and feudalism, which made it impossible to suppress the Donghak movement completely.
While Count Cassini was submitting his report, the citizens of Jeolla Province were incited to rebellion due to the county magistrate's unauthorized tax increases. When representatives were sent to Jeonju to appeal to Kim Mun-hyeon, the Governor of Jeolla Province, Kim instead had the representatives arrested and imprisoned.
Unable to endure any further, the citizens rose up in revolt, led by Jeon Bong-jun, a follower of the Donghak movement.
On February 15, 1894, the uprising broke out, achieving consecutive victories. By June, the Donghak rebels had already captured the capital of Jeolla Province, and the rebels in Chungcheong and Gyeongsang Provinces also rose in response.
The Korean king, with no other option, requested the suzerain state, the Qing Dynasty, to send troops to suppress the rebellion. This decision also presented a golden opportunity for Japan.
According to the 1885 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Tianjin, either country could send troops to Korea, provided they notified the other.
"Sugi and I are old friends, and from his words, it seems that Japan is mainly concerned with commerce and has no other intentions."
On June 2, Yuan Shikai sent a telegram to Li Hongzhang containing the above message. Yuan strongly advocated for sending troops, explaining that Sugimura Jun, the Japanese minister to Korea, was his friend and that Japan was primarily focused on economic interests. Even if China sent troops, Japan would not intervene.
However, that very day, the Japanese Foreign Ministry suddenly received an urgent telegram from Sugimura Jun, reporting that the Korean government had requested Chinese intervention through Yuan Shikai. Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu, seeing this as an invaluable opportunity, brought this message to the cabinet meeting.
"Your Majesty, these are the final two petitions from this cabinet."
On June 3, in Tokyo, Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi respectfully presented two petitions to Emperor Meiji. This emperor, whose appearance had left a deep impression on Nicholas, examined the documents. Both required his approval: the first was to dissolve the parliament, and the second was to immediately dispatch troops to Korea.
These petitions, though seemingly unrelated, were deeply connected.
The cabinet sought to dissolve the parliament because the Japanese parliament was pressuring the cabinet to resign.
Due to prolonged military preparations for a potential war with China, Japan had been facing a financial crisis since 1893. The various political parties were in heated disputes, and the opposition, holding a majority in parliament, demanded the cabinet's collective resignation to allow the opposition to take power.
On June 1, they passed a resolution for impeachment.
Ito Hirobumi faced two choices: lead the cabinet in a collective resignation or refuse to resign and petition the emperor to dissolve the parliament, thus preserving the government.
However, for the emperor to dissolve the parliament and maintain the government, a justification was needed.
The excuse was clear: war!
Using war to divert internal conflicts was a strategy Japan had successfully employed multiple times.
After presenting these two petitions to Emperor Meiji, both Ito and the emperor were fully aware of their implications.
Thus, Emperor Meiji gave identical approvals to both petitions: agreed.
The Qing Dynasty regarded this troop deployment as a routine suppression of an uprising, following international protocols, and sent a modest force of 2,500 soldiers, without any precautions.
But Japan, already determined to wage war against the Qing, deployed a well-prepared force of 7,800, three times the size of the Qing troops, ensuring a decisive first victory.
Simultaneously, the Qing troops were headed to Asan near Incheon, the front line against the Donghak rebels.
In contrast, the Japanese aimed for Seoul. The Japanese forces swiftly occupied Seoul and all key transport routes from Incheon to Seoul, ensuring smooth reinforcements from Japan to Korea.
As the storm clouds of war gathered, the Qing military deployment was already at a disadvantage, with no plans for potential conflict with Japan and no real war preparations.
However, the Donghak rebels, realizing the likelihood of a Sino-Japanese war on Korean soil, preempted Japanese plans. Seeing foreign armies entering under the pretense of quelling a rebellion, they declared an end to their uprising and withdrew from the occupied regions the day after the Japanese entered Seoul.
Li Hongzhang felt relieved, sensing the imminent threat of war since Japan's unilateral decision to send troops to Korea.
With the rebellion quelled, he believed both China and Japan could now withdraw their troops.
But the Japanese Foreign Ministry's response was: no withdrawal.
Japan's plan was not only to refuse withdrawal but also to use diplomatic friction to provoke a war with China.
As previously mentioned, diplomacy in this era was a game of cunning played by a few politicians and elites, with little regard for the general populace.
Leading this game on the Japanese side was Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu, who later became the only person to have a statue in the Japanese Foreign Ministry headquarters due to his "brilliant performance."
Mutsu provided two reasons: first, to prevent future uprisings in Korea, China and Japan should send commissioners to urge Korea to reform its internal affairs; second, to ensure one country does not remain after the other's withdrawal, an agreement for mutual withdrawal should be made.
The first point was unacceptable to the Qing Dynasty, as Korea was considered a tributary state, and Japan's suggestion was a blatant interference in its internal affairs. The second point, however, struck at the Qing's diplomatic tendencies.
Li Hongzhang's strategy also had two points: he wanted to avoid war and had two options: continue diplomatic negotiations with Japan, with uncertain outcomes, or withdraw troops regardless of Japan's actions.
For the former, Li feared Japan's determination to wage war; for the latter, the Qing feared losing face.
Mutsu Munemitsu's greatest fear was that Li Hongzhang might decide to unilaterally withdraw Chinese troops. Such a move would eliminate the friction needed to justify a war, rendering Japan's war plans moot.
To counter this, Mutsu feigned goodwill and extended an olive branch, suggesting that China and Japan could negotiate a mutual withdrawal.
Li Hongzhang took the bait.