Unable to catch Pablo, the Americans stepped things up with a two-pronged strategy. As Pablo had targeted the family members of his enemies, the CIA proposed doing the same to him:
Escobar does seem to have genuine paternal feelings for his children, and the young daughter Manuela is described as his favorite. His parents were once kidnapped by a rival group and Escobar apparently spared no effort or expense rescuing them. Whether his concern for his parents or his children would overcome his stringent security consciousness is not clear.
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The other prong was to employ a method that the CIA had used for decades in South America: arming and training death squads. It was a policy described succinctly by Bill Hicks, the comedian and social critic: "…. the reason I didn't vote for Bush is because George [HW] Bush — along with Ronald Reagan - presided over an administration whose policies toward South America included genocide. So yeah, ya see? The reason I didn't vote for him? 'Cause he's a mass murderer. I'll pay the extra nickel on petrol, just knowing brown kids aren't being clubbed to death like baby seals in Honduras, so Pepsi can put a plant down there."
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On January 30, 1993, Pablo orchestrated a car bombing in Bogotá by a bookstore. It destroyed part of the building and sent human limbs flying. Twenty-one died and seventy were injured.
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The next day, a ranch belonging to Pablo's mother was torched. His family's dwellings were bombed, injuring his mother and aunt. Days later, one of his ranches was burned. A DEA cable described a vigilante group - ideal raw material for the death squad the CIA had in mind:
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The CNP [Colombian National Police] believe these bombings were committed by a new group of individuals known as "Los Pepes" (Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar) [People persecuted by Pablo Escobar]. This group… has vowed to retaliate against Escobar, his family, and his associates, each and every time Escobar commits a terrorist act, which injures innocent people… Obviously the CP and the GOC [Government of Colombia] cannot condone the actions of "Los Pepes," even though they may secretly applaud these retaliatory acts.
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The government's response to Pablo's book- store bomb was to make him "public enemy Number one" and to offer over $6 million for information leading to his capture. The Search Bloc and Los Pepes – many members of the latter were from the former — started to execute any of Pablo's underlings they could get their hands on. Murders were reported as "Killed in a gun battle with the Colombian police."
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Los Pepes included former members of the Medellín Cartel and, in particular, the Moncada and Galeano families, with whom Pablo had remained at war. The Cali Cartel joined forces with Los Pepes by providing money and intelligence.
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The CLA didn't want to get caught training and arming a death squad that was getting financed by the Cali Cartel, which wanted to expand its cocaine business at Pablo's expense. To circumvent the law, the CLA trained the Los Pepes members who were police and special forces. With $2,000 bounties on their heads, many of the police had become frustrated by the limits of the law that prevented them from responding to Pablo with the same deadly force he'd used on them. In their official capacity, these police were trained by the CIA in torture and assassination techniques.
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Rodolpho Ospina was a descendant of Colombian presidents. After getting involved in trafficking, Pablo had attempted to kill him twice. After turning informant, he gave the Americans some advice, which the DEA relayed in a cable:
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[Ospina] states that Pablo Escobar's apprehension should be planned by accomplishing five goals. First... key Escobar organization members… should be arrested or killed, if there are no charges pending against them in Colombia. [Second], [Ospina] then named attorneys who handle Escobar's criminal problems and whose deaths would create havoc for Escobar. Third, the informant named properties and important assets belonging to Escobar which should be destroyed….
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Ospina stated that the five lead attorneys who handled Pablo's criminal and financial activities were worse than Pablo and should be killed. "These attorneys negotiate with the Colombian government on [his] behalf and are fully aware of the scope of [his] activities since [he] consults them before he carries out any action." Step five was the destruction of Pablo's property and possessions to make Pablo angry.
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[Ospina] claimed that in order to bring Escobar out of hiding, he needs to be provoked or angered and made desperate so that he wants to strike back. The informant claimed that Escobar may then make mistakes.
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Ospina suggested using the media as a weapon. "He [Pablo] controls the media through fear and payments and has confused the Colombian public by having himself portrayed as a wronged Colombian citizen, not really as dangerous as he appears to be in the foreign press." To obtain invaluable information about Pablo, he recommended cutting deals with incarcerated traffickers.
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The Americans employed Ospina's strategy on Carlos Lehder, who was claiming that Pablo had played a role in his capture and extradition. Lehder detailed Pablo's habits:
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Escobar is strictly a ghetto person, not a farm or jungle person. He fears more the communist and nationalist guerrillas than the army, so he remains in the Magdalena Medio Valley, a non-guerrilla region. Since the guerrillas remain in the high mountains one could disregard the mountains as Escobar's hiding place… Escobar always tries to keep within distance range for his cellular phone to reach Medellín's phone base. That's approximately 100 miles, so he can call any time.
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Generally, P. Escobar occupies the main house with some of his hit men, radio operator (Big High Frequency radio receiver) cooks, whores and messengers. For transportation they have jeeps, motorcycles and sometimes a boat. I have never seen him riding a horse. Escobar gets up at 1 or 2 pm and goes to sleep at 1 or 2 am.
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Fugitive Escobar uses from 15 to 30 security guards, with arms and WT (walkie-talkies). Two shifts of 12 hours each. Two at the main road entrance, some along the road, the rest around the perimeter of the main house (one mile) and one at his door... The main house always has two or three gateway paths which run to the forest and thus toward a second hideout near a river where a boat is located, or a tent with supplies and radios. Escobar is an obese man, certainly not a muscle man or athlete. He could not run 15 minutes without respiratory trouble. Unfortunately, the military-police has never used hunting dogs against him.
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